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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk
Attention is invited to two interesting decisions published in this
month’s issue of The Journal of Accountancy. One of them, No. 3518,
appertains to rental paid to a terminal company owned jointly by the rail
roads using it. The terminal company was organized to build, own and
maintain a bridge across the Ohio River near Louisville, Kentucky. The
rental charged to the railroad companies for use of this bridge was
intended to be used only to pay off, over the life of a bond issue, the cost of
the bridge and the cost of its upkeep and maintenance. The circuit court
of appeals, sixth district, ruled that these payments of rent constituted
income to the terminal corporation, and as such was taxable. While it is
not stated, it is presumable that the rentals paid by the railroads would
constitute allowable deductions from the taxable income of the railroad
corporations, if the court’s decision stands.
The commissioner has held at least in the case of Bean v. Hamilton,
that an accountant is responsible for the correctness of the figures in an
income-tax return but that the taxpayer is responsible for the data upon
which the figures are compiled. In the case above cited, which case is
embodied in treasury decision 3519, it is alleged that the taxpayer dis
closed only a part of his income to the accountant making his return, and
did not disclose to him another and larger part which would have subjected
the taxpayer to an. assessment of excess-profits tax. These features, with
others of importance, will make a reading of this decision worth while.

TREASURY RULINGS
(T. D. 3515—September 11, 1923)
Income tax—Gross income defined—Exclusions
Article 75, Regulations 62, amended.
The federal farm loan act was amended by an act (ch. 252, 42 Stat.
1454) approved March 4, 1923, authorizing the creation of federal inter
mediate credit banks, and prescribing the manner in which such banks
should be conducted. Section 210, Title II, of the act, as amended, makes
applicable to intermediate credit banks the privilege of tax exemption
accorded under section 26 of the act to federal land banks and national
farm loan associations.
Accordingly, article 75 of regulations 62 is amended to read as follows:
Art. 75. Dividends and interest from federal land banks, federal inter
mediate credit banks, and national farm loan associations.—As section 26
of the federal farm loan act of July 17, 1916 (ch. 245, 39 Stat. 360), as
amended by an act approved March 4, 1923 (ch. 252, 42 Stat. 1454), pro
vides that federal land banks, federal intermediate credit banks, and
national farm loan associations, including the capital and reserve or surplus
therein and the income derived therefrom, shall be exempt from taxation,
except taxes upon real estate, and that first mortgages executed to federal
land banks, federal intermediate credit banks, or to joint-stock land banks,
and farm loan bonds, and debentures issued by intermediate credit banks,
with the income therefrom, shall be exempt from taxation, the income
derived from dividends on stock of federal land banks, federal inter
mediate credit banks, and national farm loan associations, and from interest
on promissory notes secured by such first mortgages, or from such farm
loan bonds or debentures, is not subject to the income tax. See also section
231 (13) of the statute.
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(T. D. 3516—September 12, 1923)
Income tax—Revenue act of 1918—Decision of court.
1. Deductions—Federal Estate Taxes—Right to Deduct from Income
of Decedent.
Where a taxpayer dies during the taxable year, a return of his income
for the period in such a year during which he was alive is required showing
the net income after deducting from the gross income deductions properly
allowable by law. However, the occasion of an estate tax being death and
it being imposed only after death, such tax would not be available to the
taxpayer as a deduction during life and is accordingly not available to his
personal representative when making a return, as he is required to do, of
the income received by the decedent prior to date of death. As affecting a
decedent, the deduction of an estate tax can not have been contemplated by
the word “taxes” in section 214 (a) (3) of the revenue act of 1918. Such
tax is from its very nature deductible only from income received after the
tax has, following death, come into existence.
2. Judgment of the lower court.
Judgment of the United States district court for the eastern district of
Pennsylvania (280 Fed. 241) affirmed.
The following decision of the United States circuit court of appeals for
the third circuit in the case of Wilson Catherwood, executor of the will of
Emma R. Catherwood, deceased, v. United States, affirming the United
States district court for the eastern district of Pennsylvania (280 Fed. 241),
is published for the information of internal-revenue officers and others
concerned.
United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. No. 2903.
October Term, 1922.
Wilson Catherwood, executor of the will of Emma R. Catherwood, deceased,
plaintiff in error, v. United States, defendant in error.
Error to the district court of the United States for the eastern district
of Pennsylvania.
Before Buffington, Woolley, and Davis, circuit judges.
Woolley, circuit judge: Emma R. Catherwood died August 22, 1920. On
February 25, 1921, the plaintiff, her executor, in obedience to the revenue act
of 1918 (40 Stat. 1057, 1096-11-1), filed a return for federal tax on her
estate and paid the tax. On the same day he filed two income-tax returns.
One covered income received by the decedent during the taxable year 1920
prior to her death. In computing taxable net income the executor did not
deduct the estate tax he had that day paid because, under the regulations of
the department of internal revenue then in force, the deduction would not
have been allowed. Had the deduction been allowed and made, there would
have been no taxable income for that part of the taxable year. The other
return covered income of the estate received by the executor during the
remainder of the taxable year. This was small and, even without deducting
the estate tax, it disclosed no taxable income for that period. Therefore, if
the estate tax had been deducted in the first return, there would have been
no taxable income shown by the two returns for any part of the taxable
year. The executor brought this action to recover the amount of income
tax he had paid on income received by the decedent during the part of the
taxable year she was alive, calculated without deducting the estate tax.
The case was heard as though on demurrer and the court entered judgment
for the defendant. (280 Fed. 241.) The plaintiff sued out this writ of
error.
The question turns on the interpretation of several sections of the
revenue act of 1918 and particularly on the interpretation of section 214.
(40 Stat. 1058, 1082.) We shall approach this section by reviewing the
preceding sections to which it relates, freely using italics to direct attention
to the points under discussion.
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The matter falls first under title II of the act dealing with income tax
and later under title IV dealing with estate tax. Section 210, the first
provision with which we are concerned, declares that “there shall be levied,
collected, and paid for each taxable year upon the net income of every
individual a normal tax at the following rates.” This provision is relevant
to the matter in hand in three particulars: first, it refers to the income of
an individual, who in this case was Emma R. Catherwood; second, it
shows that the taxable income is the net income; and, third, that the
period for which such tax shall be levied, collected, and paid is a “taxable
year.” Section 200 defines “taxable year” to mean, in this instance, the
calendar year. Emma R. Catherwood, dying in August, 1920, did not live
throughout the calendar or taxable year of 1920. Had she lived through
out that year she would have obeyed section 210 by making a return con
formable with section 212, which defines the “net income” on which the
tax is levied as meaning “gross income” as defined by section 213, less
the deductions allowed by section 214. This is the section, as affected by
section 401, which calls for construction. It reads as follows:
Sec. 214. (a) That in computing net income there shall be allowed as
deductions: * * *
(3) Taxes paid or accrued within the taxable year imposed (a) by
the authority of the United States, except income, war-profits and excess
profits taxes. * * *
The estate tax, which by section 401 of the act, is “imposed upon the
transfer of the net estate of every decedent dying after the passage of this
act,” is obviously not a tax that could have been “paid” by Emma R.
Catherwood, or that could have “accrued within the taxable year” had
she lived to file her own return, for such a tax can neither accrue nor be
paid until death. So, had Emma R. Catherwood lived, she would not have
been affected by, nor could she have deducted, an estate tax. But Emma R.
Catherwood did not live throughout the taxable year. Income had been
received by her during the part of the year in which she had lived and it
was natural to expect that income would be received by her estate during
the remainder of the year after her death. For a tax on the income she
had received during the taxable year while alive she was liable. Though
liable, she could not, as she was dead at the time the tax became due, make
return and pay it herself. Anticipating such a case, and for the purpose
of gathering a tax on all the income of a decedent for the whole of a
taxable year—that which was received before death and that which was
received after death—the law requires a return to be made by her personal
representative for income received by herself—a fixed liability of her
estate—and a return to be made by him for income received by her estate—
a liability of his own. To this end the statute, by section 219, provides:
(a) That the tax imposed by sections 210 and 211 shall apply to the
income of estates or of any kind of property held in trust, including—
(1) Income received by estates of deceased persons during the period
of administration or settlement of the estate; * * *
(b) The fiduciary shall be responsible for making the return of
income for the estate or trust for which he acts.
In this connection the act, by section 225, further provides:
That every fiduciary * * * shall make under oath a return for the
individual, estate, or trust for which he acts. * * * Fiduciaries re
quired to make return under this act shall be subject to all the provisions
of this act which apply to individuals.
Therefore it is, that when an executor makes a tax return of net
income received either by the decedent or by himself during the adminis
tration of an estate, he, too, is allowed the deduction, named in section 214,
of “taxes paid or accrued within the taxable year imposed by authority
of the United States, except income, war-profits, and excess-profits taxes.”
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But this section conceivably allows an executor who has himself received
income a deduction which it does not allow a taxable making his own return.
And this is so where the death of the taxable has intervened and because,
thereupon, the law has raised a new tax, payable solely from the estate
of the taxable. This is the federal estate tax. (Sec. 401.) This tax is
not excepted from the allowable deductions under section 214, and, if “paid
or accrued within the taxable year,” it is properly deductible from gross
income received by the executor in ascertaining taxable net income. This
has been definitely determined in United States w. Woodward (256 U. S.
632, 41 Sup. Ct. 615, 65 L. Ed. 1131). That case turned primarily on the
question whether, in any event, an estate tax is a proper deduction under
section 214, and on the facts of the case the supreme court held that it
was a proper deduction to be made in a return by the executor of income
he had received in the taxable year after the decedent’s death and during
the settlement of the estate. The plaintiff contends that in principle the
Woodward case rules the case at bar where the deduction of the estate tax
is sought to be made from income received by the decedent while living.
To prevail on this contention the plaintiff must show that the supreme
court, when it held that the estate tax “becomes due not at the time of
the decedent’s death, * * * but one year thereafter, as the statute
plainly provides” (sec. 406), was wrong in construing the words “taxes
* * * accrued within the taxable year,” as used in section 214, to mean
“taxes [that] became due during the taxable year.” . It is fairly debatable
under the Woodward decision whether an estate tax accrues when due,
or, under the decision in Herts v. Woodman (218 U. S. 205), it accrues
when imposed. But aside from this question we are of opinion that in
construing section 214 the taxes there allowed as a deduction must be read
with reference to the person affected. The first return made by the
executor was, as we have shown, for income received by the decedent
during her lifetime. From such income received by her during that part
of the taxable year the deduction of an estate tax can not have been con
templated by the word “taxes” in section 214, because there was as affect
ing her, when living, no such thing as an estate tax. The occasion of an
estate tax is death and it is imposed only after death. It was in this
instance imposed upon the transfer of the decedent’s estate and the duty
of payment was imposed upon her executor. If the estate tax “accrued”
when “due” in 1921, it did not accrue within the “taxable year” of 1920
and was not, in any line of reasoning, deductible in either tax return. If
it “accrued” when “imposed” in 1920, then it “accrued within the taxable
year” within the meaning of section 214 and was, under the decision in
the Woodward case, a proper deduction to be made by the executor, in
ascertaining taxable net income from gross coming into his hands “during
the period of administration or settlement of the estate.” It so happens
in this case that, because of the small gross income received by the executor
during administration, the deduction thus available would be of no use.
Therefore, the effort is made to shift the deduction to the executor’s return
on income received by the decedent during her lifetime. There would be
nothing in this position were it not for the breadth of the language in
section 214 wherein a deduction is allowed on “taxes paid or accrued within
the taxable year,” coupled with the plaintiff’s claim that the estate tax, paid
when “due” in 1920, actually “accrued” within the “taxable year” of 1920.
The plaintiff maintains that it makes no difference in what part of the
taxable year, whether before or after the decedent’s death, the tax accrues.
For the reasons already given we are not impressed with this contention.
Assuming without deciding that the estate tax “accrued” within the “tax
able year” of 1920, it does not follow that it may be deducted at pleasure
from income received by different persons at different times during that
year. It is, from its very nature, deductible only from income received
after the tax has, following death, come into existence, not on the theory
that it is payable out of a segregated part of the estate, for it is not

451

The Journal of Accountancy
(deduction and payment are different matters), but because the deduction,
not being available to the taxable, had she lived, is not available to her
personal representative when making a return for her of income she had
received when living—a return clearly different from the one an executor
is required to make for income received by himself during the settlement
of the estate.
Finding no error, we direct that the decree below be affirmed.
(T. D. 3518—September 20, 1923)
Income tax—Revenue acts of 1913 and 1916, as amended—Decision of court.
1. Income, What Constitutes.
Payments by railroad companies, sole stockholders and tenants of a
terminal company, as rentals for their proportionate user, held to be
income.
A terminal company was organized by three railroad companies to
acquire, own, and jointly operate a railroad bridge “for the equal benefit”
of the railroad companies and “not for the purpose of making any pecuniary
profit from the undertaking.” The capital stock was taken by them in
equal proportions. The terminal company had a large outstanding mortgage
indebtedness, the payment of both principal and interest of which was guar
anteed by the railroad companies. The railroad companies agreed each with
the others, and with the terminal company, to contribute as rental to any
deficit of the terminal company in proportion to the user by each railroad
company of the terminal facilities. It was further agreed that no dividends
should be declared by the terminal company, and that “all surplus and net
earnings and income shall constitute a reserve fund for additions to and
improvements and reconstruction of the property of the terminal company.”
Held, that such contributions by way of rental payments by the railroad
companies to the terminal company to make up the annual deficit of the
latter were taxable income of the terminal company under section II G (a)
of the revenue act of 1913, section 10 of the revenue act of 1916, and
section 4 of the revenue act of 1917.
2. The payments so made by the proprietary companies as rentals
which were earnings of the latter’s operation “proceed from the property”
of the terminal company, and constitute a profit therefrom (equally whether
or not there was a net gain or net income to it), notwithstanding the agree
ment that they were not to be transformed into dividends and were ulti
mately to be a reserve fund for additions, improvements, and reconstruc
tion of the terminal property.
3. Decision of the district court reversed.
The attached decision of the United States circuit court of appeals for
the sixth circuit in the case of Elwood Hamilton, collector, v. Kentucky &
Indiana Terminal Railroad Co., is published for the information of internal
revenue officers and others concerned.
United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. No. 3821.
Elwood Hamilton, late collector of internal revenue, plaintiff in error, v.
Kentucky & Indiana Terminal Railroad Co., defendant in error.
Error to the district court of the United States for the western district
of Kentucky.
[Submitted April 9, 1923. Decided May 8, 1923. 289 Fed. 20.]
Before Knappen, Denison, and Donahue, circuit judges.
Knappen, circuit judge: Defendant in error, which we shall call the
terminal company, during the years 1915, 1916 and 1917 owned and operated
a bridge across the Ohio River for railroad, street-car, wagon, and foot
purposes between Louisville, Ky., and New Albany, Ind. By section II A (1)
[II G (a)] of the revenue act of October 3, 1913 (38 Stat. 114, 166), the
terminal company was liable to a tax of 1 per cent. upon its “entire net
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income arising or accruing from all sources” during the year 1915; by
title 1, part II, section 10, of the revenue act of September 8, 1916 (39
Stat. 756, 765), it was liable to a tax of 2 per cent. upon such income during
the year 1916; and by title I, section 4, of the revenue act of October 3,
1917 (40 Stat. 300, 302), it was liable to a tax of 4 per cent. upon such
income during the year 1917. Taxes assessed for each of the three years
were paid under protest and suit brought for their recovery. The only
question presented is whether in that suit the district court rightly rendered
judgment for the terminal company, upon the ground that it had not during
any of the years in question any taxable income whatever.
The terminal company was organized with a capital stock of $75,000
held (except as to a few qualifying shares) in equal proportions by three
railroad companies (the Southern, the Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern, and
the Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville), which acquired the terminal prop
erties (as stated in the plan of reorganization) “for the equal benefit” of
the three companies, and “not for the purpose of making any pecuniary
profit from the undertaking,” but “with the view to securing to these com
panies terminal facilities in the city of Louisville and without any purpose
of making the corporate organization a profitable one in the way of divi
dends upon any corporate stock to be issued by the new corporation.”
During the years in question the terminal company had an outstanding
mortgage bond issue of more than $6,000,000, the payment of both principal
and interest whereof was guaranteed by the three railroad companies to
facilitate the sale. By contract between the terminal company and the
three proprietary companies each of the latter was to have “full and equal
rights with the others” in the terminal property, each agreeing for a period
extending beyond the taxing years in question to make use of the terminal
company’s properties for all passenger and freight traffic within its control
destined to cross the Ohio River at Louisville. Each proprietary railroad
company was to be charged the same amount for switching per car, but
any deficit of the terminal company was to be “made up” by the three
proprietary companies in proportion to each company’s use of the terminal,1
the terminal company being required to render monthly bills to the pro
prietary companies for switching charges, and also monthly bills to each
showing amounts due by each company under the clause we have quoted
in the margin, each bill to include in its estimates one-twelfth part of the
annual taxes and of the annual fixed charges.2 Provision was also made
for excluding any proprietary company which defaulted in payment of such
bills from further use of the terminal company’s property and from en
joyment of the terminal service. It was also provided that until otherwise
expressly agreed by the proprietary companies no dividend from profits
should be declared by the terminal company, but that “all surplus and net
earnings and income shall constitute a reserve fund for additions to and
improvements and reconstruction of the property of the terminal company.”
If the payments so made by the proprietary companies are excluded
from the terminal company’s returns, that company not only had no income,
but it suffered a substantial deficit during each of the years in question. If,
however, the contributions by the proprietary companies constitute income,
the terminal company had a substantial net income within the meaning of
the statute for each of the three years, due to the fact that while the pro
prietary companies paid the bond interest in full, the terminal company was
entitled in computing its net amount to deduct but a trifle more than one1 The contract provided that the proprietary companies “shall pay for the use of the
property and facilities of the said terminal company such sums of money as shall from
time to time be required, in addition to other revenues of the terminal company, to
meet all expenses of operation and maintenance of the property of the terminal company
and all of its obligations for taxes and interest upon its first-mortgage bonds as the
same may be out-standing from time to time; the respective amounts to be paid by each
company being fixed and determined” on a basis of usage of the terminal property.
2 During the year 1915 the proprietary companies, under the contract provisions
referred to paid, $363,445.59; during 1916, the sum of $361,994.47; during 1917, the
sum of $534,981.16.
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half of the amount of the interest so paid. The terminal company raises
no question of the validity of the income-tax provisions so limiting interest
deductions. See Anderson v. 42 Broadway Co. (239 U. S. 69; T. D. 2261).
It results that if the payment of the bond interest by the proprietary com
panies to the terminal company was income, the judgment below is con
cededly wrong and should be reversed. The case thus turns solely upon
the definition of income.
In Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert (231 U. S. 399, 415; T. D. 1913),
income was defined as “the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from
both combined.” In Doyle v. Mitchell (247 U. S. 179; T. D. 2723), this
definition was approved when made to include profit gained through a sale
or conversion of capital assets. In Eisner v. Macomber (252 U. S. 189,
207; T. D. 3010), and in United States v. Phellis (257 U. S. 156, 168-9;
T. D. 3270), (both of which were stock-dividend cases), the definition
above quoted was approved, being elaborated in statement (to use the
language of the Phellis case) as “a gain derived from capital, not a gain
accruing to capital, nor a growth or increment of value in the investment,
but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable value, proceeding from the
property, severed from capital, however, invested, and coming in; that is,
received or drawn by the claimant for his separate use, benefit, and disposal.”
The terminal company invokes these definitions, and contends that the
payments made by the proprietary companies are wholly excluded there
from. In this connection it contends that its road was not operated for
profit, and invokes the broad proposition that the income-tax laws do not
treat as income that which in the generally accepted sense is not income.
We think these contentions overlook the substantial situation. The
payments made by the proprietary companies were part of the rentals to
be paid by those companies for their use of the terminal facilities. The
terminal company had a substantial gross income apart from payments made
by the proprietary companies. The latter needed the terminal facilities,
and were willing to pay what these facilities were worth. They found it
to their interest as stockholders to own equal interests in the stock, but as
proprietary companies (as distinguished from their interests as stock
holders) they saw fit to contract to pay to the terminal company, which
owned and operated the physical properties, whatever amount was required
above receipts from other sources to meet the expenses of operation,
repairs, maintenance, and conservation of property, including interest upon
the corporate indebtedness. These contributions were apportioned accord
ing to the beneficial use of the terminal facilities which each of the three
proprietary companies enjoyed. These payments were nothing more or
less than rentals of the terminal facilities. It could not well be doubted
that had they been beforehand fixed in amount they would properly be
treated as income. That these amounts were uncertain until fixed by
experience does not alter their essential nature. Nor is it open to reason
able doubt that had the amount of these so-called deficiency payments
been derived from rentals to other than the proprietary companies they
would have constituted income. Upon principle, we think these payments
were true income, and they did not fail of being such from the fact that
as the only (at least the chosen) means of obtaining the terminal company’s
facilities, and the preferred rights thereunder, the proprietary companies
were required to pay more for the facilities than perhaps could be obtained
for casual or less complete or less important service. Nor, in our opinion,
can it properly be said that the corporation was not organized for profit.
The contract provision that until otherwise expressly agreed by the pro
prietary companies no dividend from profits should be declared, etc., does
not preclude a change of policy in that regard. Nor do we think that pay
ments such as are here in question are outside the generally accepted defi
nition of income. We think it clear that the payments so made by the
proprietary companies as rentals did “proceed from the property” of the
terminal company, were earnings of the latter’s operation, and did consti
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tute a profit therefrom (and equally whether or not there was a net gain
or net income), notwithstanding, according to the then existing policy, such
profits were not to be transformed into dividends but were ultimately to
find their way into “additions to and improvements and reconstruction of
the property of the terminal company.” The contemplated “reserve fund”
to result from “surplus and net earnings and income” could be nothing else
than profits. The fact that a net income, in a taxable sense, resulted only
because the terminal company could not deduct from the rentals received
all the interest paid is unimportant, as has already appeared. That statu
tory “net income” was directly and immediately due to the interest pay
ments made by the proprietary companies is not important. We are not
impressed with the terminal company’s contention that it acted only as
distributing agent in the collection of the interest payments from the pro
prietary companies. The terminal company owned the terminal properties
subject to the payment of the mortgages thereon. The interest money was
thus paid to and used by the terminal company for meeting charges against
its own property, default in whose payment might well result in the loss of
the property. Had the interest payments been made by the proprietary
companies directly to the bondholders or the mortgage trustee, the pay
ments would have been none the less income of the terminal company.—
Anderson v. Morris, etc., Co. [C. C. A.] (216 Fed. 83, 90). It has been
held that interest on bonds of a lessor company and dividends to stock
holders of such company, paid as part of rentals by a lessee company, are
“income” of the lessor company.—Rensselaer, etc., Co. v. Irwin [C. C. A. 2]
(249 Fed. 726) ; Northern Ry. Co. v. Lowe [C. C. A. 2] (250 Fed. 856).
That dividends on stock paid by a lessee company directly to the lessor’s
stockholders, as part of an agreed rental, constitute “income” of the lessor
corporation is held in West End Street Railway v. Malley [C. C. A. 1]
(246 Fed. 625; T. D. 2620). Our conclusion, so far stated as on principle,
that the proprietary companies’ payments here involved are income within
the taxing acts here in question, is fully supported by reasoned and con
vincing adjudications, which we are content to follow.—Boston Terminal
Co. v. Gill [C. C. A. 1] (246 Fed. 664; T. D. 2671) ; Houston Belt & Ter
minal Ry. Co. v. United States [C. C. A. 5] (250 Fed. 1; T. D. 2710). The
Boston Terminal case was in its facts almost identical with the instant case.
The Houston Terminal case directly involved, as did the Boston Terminal
case, the question of interest upon a terminal company’s bonds. Every
vital question here involved was presented and decided in one or both of
these cases. The terminal company here makes no attempt to distinguish
these cases from the instant case.
It results from these views that the judgment of the district court
should be reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to take further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
(T. D. 3519—September 20, 1923)
Income and protits tax—Revenue act of 1917—Decision of court.
1. Excess-profits Tax—Separate Return.
Under the excess-profits-tax provisions of the act of October 3, 1917,
and the regulations thereunder, an individual who receives income from a
trade or business having an invested capital is required to file a separate
excess-profits-tax return in addition to his income-tax return.
2. Excess-profits-tax Return—Penalty for Failure to File.
Failure to file such a return under the conditions stated subjects the
taxpayer to the penalty prescribed by section 3176, revised statutes, as
amended, even though he makes an income-tax return which impliedly
shows that he was not engaged in a business having an invested capital and
that he did not owe any excess-profits tax upon income derived from a
business having invested capital.
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3. Return—Failure to File Reasonable Cause for Failure.
The fact that the taxpayer turned over to an expert accountant what
he thought was all the data necessary to make out complete and accurate
income and excess-profits-tax returns, and that through inadvertence he
failed to give the accountant all the necessary facts, as a result of which
his income was understated in his income-tax return and no excess-profitstax return was filed does not constitute reasonable cause for failure to file
an excess-profits-tax return, the facts also showing that the taxpayer
executed the income-tax return without looking at it or noting the amount
thereof.
4. Appeal and Error—Matters Concluded by Judgment in Trial by
Court.
In an action by a taxpayer to recover a refund of a penalty of 50 per
cent. imposed by the commissioner of internal revenue under section 3176,
revised statutes, as amended by section 16 of the revenue act of 1916, and
paid under protest, where a jury is waived, a judgment dismissing the action
involves a finding of fact that the plaintiff failed to make and file a return
within the time prescribed by the statute.
The attached decision of the United States circuit court of appeals
for the sixth circuit in the case of James B. Beam v. Elwood Hamilton,
collector, is published for the information of internal-revenue officers and
others concerned.

United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. No. 3787.
James B. Beam, plaintiff in error, v. Elwood Hamilton, collector of internal
revenue, defendant in error.
Error to the district court of the United States for the western district
of Kentucky.
[Submitted April 9, 1923. Decided May 15, 1923. 289 Fed. 9.]
Before Knappen, Denison, and Donahue, circuit judges.
Knappen, circuit judge: This writ brings up for review a judgment
rendered in favor of the collector in a suit by plaintiff in error to recover
a penalty of 50 per cent. assessed (and paid under protest) for alleged
failure to make a return under the revenue act of October 3, 1917 (40
Stat. 300). During that calendar year (and for many years before) plain
tiff in error was the vice-president and general manager of a distillery, for
which service he received an annual salary of $4,200. On his shares of
stock therein he drew dividends of $18,000. He was also on his own
account (and for several years preceding had been) engaged in the business
of registered distiller and wholesale and retail liquor dealer, and as such
distiller owned and operated that individual business. He made an incometax return showing the salary and dividends referred to and several thou
sand dollars of other income (not connected with his personal distillery
and liquor business), showing a net taxable income of $27,472.78, on which
a tax of $1,360.74 was computed and paid. No return whatever was made
of his income from his personal business as distiller, etc., from which he
received during 1917 an income of $51,994.70. A return thereof would have
made plaintiff liable to an additional income tax of $4,333.18 (a total of
$5,693.92 instead of $1,360.74), and to an excess-profits tax of $21,155.47.
On discovering this situation the commissioner made a new assessment of
taxes on the correct basis, adding to the taxes assessed a penalty of 100
per cent. ($5,693.92) for making a false and fraudulent return, and a
penalty of 50 per cent. upon the excess-profits taxes for failure to make
and file an excess-profits return. The entire of the additional taxes and
penalties so assessed was paid under protest. In this suit to recover both
items of penalties paid, the district court (which tried the case on statu
tory waiver of jury, under Rev. Stat. 649, U. S. Comp. Stat. sec. 1587)
concluded that the return actually made was not false and fraudulent, it
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appearing to have been prepared by an expert accountant, plaintiff in error
claiming he had given the accountant full data for the return and that he
had executed the same without “looking at it or noting the amount thereof.”
The court held, however, that plaintiff was not entitled to recover the
50 per cent. penalty assessed and paid for failure to make an excess-profits
return. The government has not asked review of the judgment regarding
the 100 per cent. penalty. Plaintiff in error does not complain of the
reassessed taxes paid. The only question here relates to the 50 per cent.
penalty.
Revised Statutes 649 (U. S. Comp. Stat. sec. 1587) provides that “the
finding of the court upon the facts, which may be either general or special,
shall have the same effect as the verdict of a jury.” Revised statutes sec.
700 (U. S. Comp. stat. sec. 1668) provides for a review of the rulings of
a court in the progress of a trial if excepted to at the time and presented
by bill of exceptions, and that “when the finding is special the review may
extend to the determination of the sufficiency of the facts found to support
the judgment.” The record does not show that any request for special
findings was made, nor that any finding was made except that in the
judgment entry the court “found the fact to be that the said return, upon
which said penalty was based, imposed and collected as stated in the plead
ings, was not wilfully ‘false’ nor ‘fraudulent,’ nor was it wilfully made with
intent to defeat or evade assessment of a tax.” The return referred to is
obviously the income-tax return actually made, on which the tax of
$1,360.74 was computed and paid. The statute under which the penalty
in question was assessed (Rev. St. sec. 3176, as amended Sept. 8, 1916—39
Stat. p. 775; U. S. Comp. Stat. sec. 5899) provides that “in case of any
failure to make and file a return or list within the time prescribed by law,
or by the collector, the commissioner of internal revenue shall add to the
tax fifty per centum. of its amount,” subject to an exception hereinafter
referred to. A fraudulent failure to file return is not necessary to the im
position of that penalty; concededly, mere failure is enough. With
reference to that item the judgment entry is merely “in respect to the
remainder of the amount sought to be recovered by the plaintiff, viz., the
further sum of $11,015.21, and interest thereon, the court is of opinion and
now adjudges that plaintiff’s action should be and it is dismissed.” This
adjudication has the force of a general verdict of a jury, and (in the
absence of exception to the admission of evidence) is conclusive upon all
matters of fact involved therein. See Lehnen v. Dickson (148 U. S. 71) ;
Vicksburg, etc., Ry. Co. v. Anderson, etc., Co. (256 U. S. 408, 415);
National Surety Co. v. C. N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. [C. C. A. 6] (145 Fed. 34) ;
Mason v. Smith [C. C. A. 6] (191 Fed. 502, 503). Our statement of facts,
supra, is supported by admissions in pleadings or otherwise.
The exception in the 50 per cent. penalty provision before referred to
is that “when a return is voluntarily and without notice from the collector
filed after such time, and it is shown that the failure to file was due to a
reasonable cause, and not to wilful neglect, no such addition shall be made
to the tax.” On this record plaintiff is not entitled to the benefit of this
exception. The fact of voluntary return without notice from the collector
is not found, the allegation thereof in plaintiff’s petition is denied by the
answer, and there is direct evidence to the contrary. Two witnesses testified
without dispute, that plaintiff refused, under advice of his accountant, to
sign the excess-profits-tax return prepared by the revenue officers. Pre
sumably the extent of plaintiff’s actual claim in respect to voluntary return
of the excess-profits tax is that his act in furnishing the revenue officers
with the details of his income from his personal business, which was
incorporated into the proposed return and upon which the excess-profits
tax was assessed, amounted to a making of such return by him.
The sole substantial question presented is whether the penalty provision
involved extends to a failure to make a return of excess profits, or whether
it is limited to failure to make any income-tax return.
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In our opinion the 50 per cent, penalty applied to the failure to make
an excess-profits-tax return. The excess-profits feature had its genesis in
the United States in the act of March 3, 1917, which applied only to cor
porations and partnerships. The act of October 3, 1917, with which we are
concerned, applied to individuals as well, and superseded the act of March 3,
so covering the entire of the year 1917 (Holmes Federal Taxes, 1923 ed.,
p. 1213). In the act of October 3 a distinction between ordinary income
taxes and excess-profits taxes was clearly recognized, separate and distinct
provisions being made for return of the two classes of taxes. The act was
divided into 13 titles, title I relating to war income taxes, title II to war
excess-profits taxes, titles III to IX, inclusive, and title XI relating, respect
ively, to taxes on beverages, tobacco and manufactures thereof, public
utilities and insurance, excise, admissions and dues, stamp taxes, estate
tax, and postal rates. Title X contained administrative provisions, title XII
income-tax amendments, and title XIII general provisions. Section 201,
which is part of title II, imposed the excess-profits taxes in question.
Section 212, also part of title II, expressly made applicable thereto all
provisions of title I of the act of September 8, 1916, as amended by the
revenue act here in question, relating to returns and payment of the tax
therein imposed, “including penalties,” thus incorporating into title II of
the act of October 3, 1917, the requirement of section 8 of title I of the
1916 act, which requires a “true and accurate return under oath” to be
made “in such form as the commissioner of internal revenue, with the
approval of the secretary of the treasury, shall prescribe;” while section
213 (also part of title II) authorized the commissioner of internal revenue,
with the approval of the secretary of the treasury, to make regulations
for carrying out the provisions of that title, and to require corporations,
partnerships, or individuals subject to the provisions thereof “to furnish
him with such facts, data, and information as in his judgment are necessary
to collect the taxes imposed by this title,” viz., the excess-profits taxes. In
1917 the commissioner provided two separate forms for individual tax
returns, No. 1040, entitled “Individual income-tax return for calendar year
1917,” and No. 1101, entitled “Individual excess-profits-tax return for
calendar year 1917.” Heading A on form 1040 contained blanks for details
regarding “income from salaries, wages,” etc. The first paragraph of
instruction No. 7 (Form 1040), entitled “excess-profits taxes,” directed
that “if your net income reported under A * * * exceeded $6,000 you
are subject to an excess-profits tax at the rate of 8 per cent. on the amount
by which the net total under A exceeds $6,000.” Heading B on form 1040
relates to “income from business (including farming).” The second para
graph of instruction No. 7 on that form reads: “If your total income from
all sources exceeded $6,000 and you received any income from a trade or
business with invested capital, you should get a copy of the excess-profitstax return (Form 1101) and calculate the amount of your tax, if any, as
directed therein.” On form 1101 instruction 2 reads: “Every individual
employing invested capital in his trade or business and having a net income
for 1917 of $6,000 or more must make a return on this form;” and instruc
tion No. 4 on form 1101 gives the information that net income subject to
excess-profits taxes falls into two classes; that the first comprises all net
income derived from trade or business (including occupations and profes
sions) having no invested capital or not more than a nominal capital, and
includes incomes reported in schedule A, form 1040; that the tax on such
income should be computed and entered on Form 1040 according to the
instructions thereon; but that all other income subject to tax (with ref
erence to instruction No. 3 above, which in terms relates to excess-profits
taxes) should be entered on form 1101, and the tax computed as directed
in the instructions on that form. This form 1101 contained four schedules,
designated, respectively, as “net income subject to tax,” “adjusted capital,”
“deduction,” and “computation of tax,” each heading containing express
reference to excess-profits-tax regulations. This form 1101 was required
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to be sworn to as “a true and complete return” * * * “pursuant to the
excess-profits-tax regulations.”
We think the two returns, thus so clearly distinguished, in connection
with the requirement of separate return on form 1101, do not lose their
separability or distinct identities from the fact that the amount of the
excess-profits tax is to be carried onto form 1040, under headings 34 and
35, designated respectively as “excess-profits tax at rate of 8 per cent.
(see instruction No. 7, page 1)” and “excess-profits tax on income from
business with invested capital, as computed on excess-protits-tax return
form 1101;” nor from the fact that the excess-profits tax is to be deducted,
in line L of form 1040, from the taxable income otherwise shown thereby.
As plaintiff’s income from salaries, wages, etc., under subdivision A,
form 1040, did not amount to $6,000, he was not subject to excess-profits
taxes thereon. The blanks under B, however, relating to income from
business having invested capital, were left unfilled (as was the blank in
line L relating to deduction of excess-profits taxes), and so form 1040
failed to show any income subject to excess-profits tax. In view of the
considerations we have pointed out, we are unable to agree with plaintiff’s
contention that because schedule B was so left blank, and plaintiff thereby
(impliedly only) made a return that he was not engaged in a business
with invested capital and that he did not owe any excess-profits tax, he
thereby made a return within the meaning of the excess-profits title,
although the return so impliedly made on form 1040 was untrue; nor with
the further contention that unless the return actually made was wilfully
false or fraudulent, as the court below found it was not, plaintiff can not
be subject to the penalty for failure to make another return as to which
the liability is not conditioned upon fraudulent action. Not only was the
excess-profits tax a separate, distinct, and then novel source of revenue,
but the statute and regulations, as we have above shown, in express and
formal terms required separate and distinct returns thereof, and we think
it clear that failure to make a separate return of excess-profits tax is none
the less a failure to make the return contemplated by the statute because
of the mere fact that the computations on the excess-profits return are to
be carried onto form 1040; the use of that form also is necessary to a
complete report. By section 213 the commissioner was undoubtedly given
authority, with the approval of the secretary of the treasury, to require
both returns. The document, failure to make which the statute penalizes,
is not styled a “report;” the statute denominates it as a “return or list;”
and form 1101 is plainly such “return or list.” The statute penalizes “any
failure to file a return or list,” etc. Nor is there any inconsistency between
the court’s finding of lack of “wilfully false or fraudulent” action as applied
to the return made on form 1040, and the conclusion of liability for failure
to make an excess-profits return. While we must assume, in view of the
judgment, that plaintiff thought he had acquainted the expert with his
ownership of a separate distillery business, and so did not act fraudulently,
the accountant testified on the trial that plaintiff “never informed” him that
he (plaintiff) “was in business as a distiller on his own account.” In so
far as the conclusion of fact so testified to was essential to the judgment
rendered, the trial court is presumed to have believed the testimony. We
think the commissioner justified in holding that while the accountant was
responsible for the correctness of the figures, plaintiff was responsible for
the source of the same and sufficient details to insure a complete under
standing of the business, and that failure to take such precaution to
“discover the omission of the principal item of income” does not “constitute
reasonable cause for failure to file an excess-profits-tax return, which was
also due to the omission of the income in question from [plaintiff’s] incometax return.” The penalty, while drastic, was intended to insure payment
of public revenue. No question of its reasonableness is involved.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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